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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GARTH WHITNEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent

Case No.
11959

- vs DAVE WALKER and
CHANAE WALKER,
Defendoots-Appellants

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising out
of an automobile accident.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A trial by jury was held and resulted in a verdict
for the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in the sum
1

of $1,351.40 Special Damages and $37 ,500.00 General
Damages. (R-79)
A Motion for New Trial was filed (R-80) and denied
by the Honorable Court. (R-88)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Garth Whitney, age 40, a real estate sales.
man, on September 19, 1968, had driven his wife to a
P.T.A. meeting and had parked his vehicle in a church
parking driveway at 70th South and 23rd East, which
is located across the street from the Butler School. It
was shortly after 8 p.m. and dark. He had parked facing
north on the east side of the driveway and had alighted
from the driver's side when he noticed some headlights
of a car entering the driveway from the east. (T-11)
He then continued to stand by the side of his car,
in the process of locking the door, when he was struck
by the vehicle. He had not seen the car approach after
he had seen the lights of the car as it entered the drive·
way. (T-13)
The vehicle involved in the collision was being driven
by Chanae Marie Walker, 15 year old daughter of Dave
Walker. Mr. Walker had just purchased the automobile
and had permitted his daughter to drive it a short dis·
tance prior to the happening of the accident.
Mr. Whitney suffered injuries to the groin area
(T-18), and was hospitalized 16 days. (T-19)
2
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The suit was filed against Chanae Marie Walker, a
minor, and her father Dave Walker, based solely on the
fatherjs statutory liability inasmuch as his daughter was
under the age of 18 at the time of the accident.
POINT ONE
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT MINOR 18 A NULLITY IN THAT NO
GUARDIAN AD LITEM WAS APPOINTED TO PROTECT HER INTEREST.

The record in this case shows that no Guardian ad
Litem has ever been appointed for the minor.
Rule 17 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"When an infant ... is a party he must appear
either by his general guardian, or by a guardian
ad litem appointed in the particular case by the
Court in which the action is pending."
Rule 17 (c):
"When a guardian ad litem is appointed by a
Court, he must be appointed as follows: (2) When
the infant is Defendant, upon the applications of
the infant, if he is of the age of 14 years and applies within 20 days after the service of the summons, or if under the age, or if a relative or fri?nd
of the infant, or of any other party to the action,
(Emphasis above added)
We find no Utah Supreme Court case directly in
point, but this Court has strongly upheld the requirement of a guardian ad litem in these cases. In Bal,lard
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-vs- Buist, 8 Ut. 2d 308, 333 P2d 1071, where the Plaintiff

minor sued, a guardian ad litem was lat.er appointed
and this procedure was upheld as curing the error.
Court stated at 333 P2d 1073:

"The protection with which the law cloaks an
infant should not be used by others as a weapon
against an infant."
In 43 C.J.S. Infants, Sec. 109 (b), Page 386, the text
states:
" No one has authority to appear and answer
for an infant defendant without having been first
appointed by the Court for that purpose, and a
Decree rendered on the answer or defense of a
person who has aS'sumed to act as a gaurdian ad
litem for the infant without any such appointment
is erroneous and does not conclude the infant."
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Allen -vs- Hickman, (1963) 383 P2d 676 at Page 678 has said:
"The appointment of a gaurdian ad lit.em for
an infant defendant is not a mere formality, but
has for its basis the protection of rights of one
under disability ... we are also aware that the appointment o.f a gaurdian ad litem during the
course of trial may 'Serve to validate otherwise objectionable proceedings against an infant daughter, if such is done in time to adequately protect
the interest of the Defendant. In the instant case,
however, the matter of the absence of a
ad litem aparently escaped the court's attention
until both Plaintiffs and Defendants had completed their cases in chief, although it had
mentioned at pre-trial conference about eJ.ght
4

monthts earlier. It is extremely doubtful that an
of a guardian ad litem at that stage
of the tnal could have been said to be in time to
adequately protect the minor interest.
Also, the fact that, as this CMe an infant defendant is actually represented at the trial by his
parents, or that adult defendants whose interests
are the same as those of the infant are making
proper defense by their counsel, does not cure
failure to have a guardian ad litem appointed to
represent the infant."
Again in 1964 the Oklahoma Supreme Court had
occasion to rule on facts squarely in point with the case
at bar.
In Lane -vs- Snitz, 389 P2d 962, the Defendant minor
was sued, a trial had, and judgment entered. On motion
for a. new trial, the lack of a guardian ad litem to protect
the interests of the minor was advanced for the first time.
The judgment was reversed.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court points out that 12
O.S. 1961, Section 228 provides that the defense of an
infant must be by guardian appointed for the suit.
Further Section 229, 12 O.S., 1961, like the Utah
Statute, provides:
"Appointment of guardian ad litem -:appointment may be made upon the application
of the infant if he be of the age of 14 years and
apply in 20 days after the return of summons. If
he be under the age of 14, or neglects so to apply,
5

may be made upon the applica.
tion.
.friend. of,, the infant, or that of the
Pla'l!nhff in the action. (Emphasis ours)
The Oklahoma Court cites Sealey-vs- Smith, 81 Okla.
97. 197 P. 490:
"In the body of that opinion it is pointed out
that
ormance of a general duty by a legal
guardian does not affect nor relieve the; trial court
of the imperative duty to comply with the plain
provisions of the statute requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem to make bona fide
defense of the rights of the infant defendant."
The Arizona Supreme Court in B onan -vs- Nationd
Bank of Arizona, 367 P2d 950 at 955 states:
"Certainly, where minors are involved, there
can be no dispensing of any of the rights or safeguards created for their protection. It would be
a legal paradox for the Courts to throw every con·
ceivable protection around the rights and interests
of infants and then disregard the essential fact
of jurisdiction."
Again in Pintek -vs- Superior Coitrt, 78 Ariz. 179,
277 P2d 265 (1954), the Supreme Court states at Page
268:
" ... an infant cannot bring or defend a legal
proceeding in person but must sue or be
by
legally appointed general guardian, or next friend
or guardian ad litem."
"In the instant case the minors had a general
guardian of both their persons and estates, hence
6

not
sui juris in their own persons they had
no nght to appear by an attorney of their own
choosing without first having obtained an order
of court appointing ... a guardian ad litem to act
in their behalf."
We anticipate that respondent will advance the argument that where a guardian ad litem is not appointed
the judgment is only voidable and not void.
We recognize that other jurisdictions have so held.
The test, however, as stated by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Allen -vs- Hickman, (Supra) is as follows:
"While it is true that a judgement rendered
against an infant not represented by a guardian
ad litem is not void, but only voidable, as held in
the only authority cited by Plaintiff on this point,
that is not the precise question before us this time,
since no judgement was actually entered against
the minor defendant."
That this judgment against defendant minor Chanae
Marie Walker is prejudicial to her is pointed out in the
affidavit in support of the Motion for New Trial, (R-86)
wherein it is pointed out that the judgment against the
minor far exceeds the limits of liability insurance protection which was afforded her as a result of this law
suit.
Furthermore, we feel it needs no argument that any
judgment rendered against a minor, who has had no
guardian ad litem appointed as required by the Statute
for her protection, is a prejudice from which the minor
is entitled to relief, as that is in derrogation of the very
7

purpose of the statute requiring legal protection of the
minor's interests.
POINT TWO
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DA VE WALKER IS
BASED SOLELY ON HIS VICARIOUS LIABILITY
AND MUST BE REVERSED, UPON REVERSAL
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE MINOR.

OF

The Plaintiff's Complaint states :

"l. . . . and at said time and place Chanae
Marie Walker negligently, carelessly and in violation of law, and as an agent for her father, Dave
Walker, drove an automobile into and against the
Plaintiff ... "

"2. "That the Defendant, Chanae Marie Walker, was a minor and was driving said vehicle with
the express or implied permission of the Defendant, Dave Walker, her father, making him liable
as a matter of law for the injury and damage
sustained by Plaintiff."
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment against the Defendants jointly and severally.... "
It will be noted, therefore, that Plaintiff's case was
not based on any independent act of negligence on the
part of Dave Walker. His entire case, from the Complaint
on through the trial, was that the minor was negligent,
and her negligence, by law, is imputed to her father,

Dave Walker.
It is therefore, of no concern that Plaintiff could
or might have sued Defendant Dave Walker individually,
alone or under another theory of his case. He did not.
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In Sweatman -vs- Linton (1925) 66 Utah 208, 241
P, 309, this Court recognized the rule established in other
jurisdictions as follows, with relation to joint tort f easors
(which the defendants here are not).
"As we interpret the holding of the Courts.
it is to the effect that Appellate Courts will not
affirm as to one tort feasor and reverse as to another when the facts and circumstances made to
appear in the case are such that an injustice will
result to the tort-feasor against whom the judgment is affirmed."
We hasten to point out, however, that the Defendants
in the case at bar, are not joint tort f easors. According
to Plaintiff's own pleadings and the theory of his entire
case, the Defendant minor is the only alleged tort feasor,
and her negligence is imputed by statute and the law
of agency to her father"
In Bishop -vs- Superior Court (1922), 59 Cal. App.
46, 209 P. 1012 the Court states :
It is too plain to require extended discussion
that the liability of the principal in this case is
entirely dependent upon that of the agent. If it be
held that such findings and judgment were not
supported by the evidence, surely there can be no
basis for liability upon the part of the principal.
An exoneration of the agent must exonerate the
principal, since the only wrong found to have been
done by the principal, was through the agent."
The California Supreme Court in 1944, Gardner -vsMarshall, 151 P2d 122, has again upheld this position.
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There, Plaintiff sued the driver and his corporate
employer. Judgment was rendered against both. The
Trial Court granted the driver a new trial, but the judg.
ment against the corporation was entered. The Court
states:

"It is conceded that liability on the pa.rt of
the corporation defendant can be enforced only by
the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior, the defendants not beilng joint tort feasors
(our emphasis)
"Since it has been conclusively established
in this case that (the driver's) motion for a. new
trial was properly granted it must also follow that
his employer's motion for a new trial should also
have been granted."
In Vynn -vs- N. W. Casualty Co. (56) (Cal. Supreme
Court) 301 P2d 869, the rule is stated:
"A judgment against all defendants must be
reversed, where a reversal against one defendant
removes the legal basis for the judgment against
the others."
The only basis for a judgment against Dave Walker
is a judgment against his daughter, for which he is
jointly and severally liable.
A reversal of the judgment against the minor, requiring a new trial, must require a reversal as to both
defendants.

10
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Should a. new trial result in a. verdict. for the minor
of no liability, there is no liability upon the father, Should
it result in a. verdict for the Plaintiff, the judgement
amount obviously would differ from the present judgment.
Such a reRult would leave Defendant Dave Walker
with two judgments against him, with only one against.
his minor daughter.
The judgment, being void as to the minor for failure
to appoint a guardian ad litem, and requiring reversal,
must therefore also result. in a reversal of the judgment.
as to Defendant, Da.ve W alkero
POINT THREE
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 15, MORTALITY
TABLES, WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.

Instruction No. 15 (R-27 ...., which is Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 14 (R-41) which was given over
Defendants' objection and exception, stated:
Instruction No. 15
"According to the U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare Mortality Tables, 1957,
t.he expectancy of life of one aged 41 years is 31.4
years."
The requirement that the Plaintiff's permanent injuries be such that they will result in a permanent impairment of a substantial nature to his future earning ca-
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pacity, before Mortality Tables are admissible, is wholl
lacking in this case.
Y
This Honorable Court has previously made this re.
quirement absolute, in no uncertain terms.
In Schlatter-vs-McCarthy, 196 P2d 968, 113 Ut. 543
(1948), this Court says:
"This Court has approved the use of such
(mortality) tables in certain cases. Brwner -vs.
McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P2d 49; Pauly -vs.
McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P2d 123, 129. But
such tables are not admissible in all cases of personal injury, nor even in all cases where the injuries are permanent. The rule of Bruner -vsMcCarthy, supra, permitting the introduction in
evidence of such tables was carefully limited in
Paul,y -vs- McCarthy, supra. We there said:
"We wish to make it clear that we do not
hold that in every case where permanent injuries are alleged and evidence in support
thereof is introduced, that the mortality and
annuity tables are admissible. We go only
so far as to hold that where the injury alleged
and proved is permanent, and is of such n:z·
ture as to indicate a permanent material
impairment of a substantial. nature in the
earning capacity of the Plaintiff, the mortality and annuity tables are admissible."
(Courts emphasis)
"There can be no doubt in this case that Plaintiff sustained very serious personal injuries, and
that such injuries will to some extent be perman·
ent in nature. The real question is
evidence adduced at trial would support a fmding
12

that the injuries were "of such nature as to indicate a permanent material impairment of a substantial nature in the earning capacity of the
Plaintiff."
In Mitchell -vs- Arrowhead Freight Lines, 117 Ut.
224, 214 P2d 620, the Plaintiff suffered injuries to his
neck, several fractures of the jaw, loss of motion of his
thumb, a fractured nose making breathing restricted,
early fatigue, etc.
It was disputed as to whether he had suffered permanent impairment to his earning capacity, and the jury
apparently found that he had.

This Court stated:
"The jury was instructed that unless it first
found from a preponderance of the evidenc that
Plaintiff sustained a permanent impairment of a
substantial nature to his earning capacity, the
tables were to be disregarded." (Emphasis ours)
The Plaintiff, Mr. Whitney does not even claim that
his occupation as a real estate salesman is now, or will
be, in any way impaired by the permanent residual to his
penis.

The accident occurred on September 19, 1968, and
the Plaintiff returned to work, as a real estate salesman,
at least on a part-time basis, in January, 1969, about four
months later. (T-59)
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In the middle of March, he returned to full time
work, (T-59) and has carried on his full work activities
smce.
Dr. Oniki testified: (T-48)
"Q.

Doctor, the only residual effect, that is any
disability at all is in regards to the penis 1 ·

A.

Well, penis and attending difficulty that he's
having, yes.

Q.

Yes, the other injuries have healed or are now
not disabling1

A.

Calf is healed, the thigh has healed. The groin
has this residual hard lumpiness but is not
disabling.

Q. What difficulty, if any, does this cause1
A. In the groin 1
Q. Yes.
A. None at the present time.
Q. Thank you. Anything else, any of the other
injuries that are giving any difficulty at the
present time T
A. No, just the injury to the penis and the base ,
of the penis."
The evidence, therefore, was undisputed that Plaintiff suffered no permanent impairment of earning capacity to any degree, and that the admission of the
Mortality Tables was prejudicially erroneous.
POINT FOUR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
MEDICAL EVIDENCE THAT WAS HERESAY AND
CONJECTURAL.
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During the testimony of Dr. Oniki, he was pennitted
to testify about a prostate condition, which he had not
diagnosed, but which was reported in a letter by another
doctor, which Dr. Oniki had read. (T-43 to 47)
On direct examination, Dr. Oniki was asked: (T-43)
'Q.

Did you receive a report from a Doctor Dahl
urologist, concerning the examination of
manT

A.

Yes.

Q.

In that report he indicates that the condition
of prostatitis-

MR. MIDGLEY: Just a second, now. I object to
this. He's talking about some other report."
At this point, the Trial Court recognized the validity
of the objection but opened the door for Plaintiff by
suggesting a method of approach which is completely
erroneous in law, and the rules of evidence. (T-43-44)
"THE COURT: I think there is probably an
objection here, Mr. Schaerrer1 from the standpoint
that the doctor here going through that report,
which is someone else's report and testifying as
to what he thinks about it or in evaluating it or
trying to clarify it. I think if you were to take
the report yourself and ask him, give a hypothetical factual situation based upon what that report
indicates, then ask him what he feels from reasonable medical certainty what he indicates the facts
will be the Court will admit that.
MR. MIDGLEY : I will object.
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COURT: I don't think Mr. Schaerrer is go.
mg to read the report. He's just going to state
certain facts he may take from that report or any
other source he wants. He may ask the Doctor
based on reasonable medical certainty.
Q.

(By Mr. Schaerrer) Let me ask you this, Doc.
or, what is prostatitis T

A.

Prostatitis.

Q.

Would you explain what that is T

MR. MIDGLEY: We object. There's no indica.
tion o.f any such condition with this patient.
THE COURT: Well, could there be a reasonable
probabiliy, medical probabiliy or possibiliy, Doctor, either that a person with the type of injuries
and the syndrome that he's developed might have
prostatitis T (Our emphasis)
A.

At the time that he was injured we put in a
catheter and he wore that catheter for a pe·
riod of time. This could contribute to having
retained infection in the prostate and causing
prostatitis or abstinence from intercourse
would be another cause. (Our emphasis)
'

Q.

You made a finding, I believe, Doctor, that
he was tender or had pain at the base of the
penis?

A. Yes.
Q. Is this consistent with prostatitis 1
A.

No, well, this is farther ou so I wouldn't
this was connected with prostatitis. It wou
be more injury or scar to the shaft itself."
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The Court again suggested Plaintiff's Counsel ask
a hypothetical question, which he did, concluding the
question with this final question: (T-47)

"Q.

. , . do you have a medical opinion based upon
these hypothetical facts as to whether or not
such a person could have prostatitis as a
result of this injury and treatment.

MR. MIDGLEY: Same objection.
THE COURT: Overruled. He may answer it.
A.

He could have. (Our emphasis)

Q,

Do you have a medical opinion as to whether
or not Mr. Whitney has prostatitis 1

A,

Only to the extent that Doctor Dahl has reported it and since he is the urologist it is
not out of line that he does report this."

Not only was the doctor permitted to conjecture
about a. condition he did not diagnose, he was permitted
to base his testimony on hearsay, and was encouraged by
the, Trial Court to link that condition as an additional
injury suffered by the Plaintiff as a proximate cause
of the accident.
The admission of this additional testimony was
highly prejudicial to the Defendants, and requires a
reversal.
POINT FIVE
THE VERDICT IS EXCESSIVE AND THE RESULT
OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE.
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Rule 59 .(a) (5) Ut.ah Rules of Civil Procedure, of
course, pernuts a new trial where the verdict is i'exces.
sive . . . appearing to have been given under the influ.
enceJ of passion or prejudice."
Our research fails to disclose a case wih identical
or even similar facts. We are relegated, therefore, t.o'
a. comon sense analysis of the facts before us, and the
damages awarded.
The injuries to the plaintiff were of the "eye-brow
raising" variety. They involved the male organs of the
Plaintiff. The anticipated testimony was such that even
the Trial Judge gave the following statement to the
jury, in advance of the testimony, to "condition" their
sensibilities: (T-7)
"Before going forward with this case, ladies
and gentlemen of the jury, the Court wants to
advise you that the testimony in this case will be
a little bit different than the average case. It ,
will be on a rather delicate type matter, which
would ordinarily be embarrassing to you if it
wasn't a court of law. It will be on the type of
subject that you wouldn't ordinarily discuss with
each other as strangers. Nevertheless, it is neel'$·
sary in this case, because evidently in
injuries suffered by this plaintiff with the grom
area and suffered in reproductive organs. So, a
lot of medical testimony will be along those lines.
Therefore, I want you to be prepared .and I don't
want you to be embarrassed or
because
this is a court of law and you should listen
fully and weigh carefully all the testimony that is
presented."
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The Plaintiff's injuries originally were serious and
painful. He was hospitalized 16 days. He gradually improved. He had no broken bones, no internal injuries to
organs. Within two to three months he had returned to
at least part-time employment. By March, 1969, three to
three-one/half months after the accident, he was engaged
in full time employment.
His only residual was to the distal end of his penis,
which was flacid and insensitive on erection. He is not
impotent (T-49); he can accomplish intercourse with his
wife "with difficulty," and his doctor has consulted with
him and his wife on this problem "in order to attempt
to correct that difficulty." (T-49)
In Plaintiff's normal daily activity, however, there
was not one iota of evidence that he has, or will have,
any discomfort and certainly no loss of bodily function
at all.
His permanent loss, therefore, is "some difficulty"
during sexual relations, which, if we are realistic and
accept the inevitable slowing of advancing age, will not
average once a week by the time he is ten years older.
The verdict of $37 ,500, for this occasional "difficulty," was obviously inspired by the inflammatory effect
of the mere discussion of sex organs in a mixed audience.
Even the Trial Court anticipated embarrassment
and uneasiness on the part of the jury because of the
subject to be discussed in their presence.
19

In Paiil -vs- Kirkendall, [Ut.2d], 261 P2d at 671

.
'
this Court stated the test of whether the damages awar.

ded were excessive, as follows :

"The question here on appeal, then, is a deter.
mination of whether damages awarded bear no
proper relation to the wrong suffered as shown
by the evidence and in accordance with the instructions of the Court so that this Court mav
exercise its power to set aside the verdict of
jury."
$37 ,500 General Damages for pain and suffering for
not over three months, followed by a complete return to
full and complete bodily function, except "difficulty" in
accomplishing intercourse, for which the doctor gave
advice and instructions on how to overcome, is unconscionable.
Respectfully Submitted,

L. E. MIDGLEY
Attorney for DefendantsAppeUants
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